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provision is affected by political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and 
democratic participation. In order to address this issue we take advantage of a new global 
efficiency measure for Norwegian local governments. There is strong evidence that high 
fiscal capacity and a high degree of party fragmentation contributes to low efficiency. In 
addition we find that increased democratic participation tends to increase efficiency, 
while a centralized top down budgetary process is associated with low efficiency. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The economic performance of governments is an important topic in political economy, 
and the ability to control debt and deficits have received large attention since the seminal 
contributions by Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) and Von Hagen (1992). Roubini and Sachs 
showed that weak or fragmented governments lead to high budget deficits in OECD 
countries, whereas Von Hagen found that hierarchical budget procedures were associated 
with low budget deficits in EU countries. The following empirical literature has to a large 
extent focused on the impact on fiscal policy, including taxes and public spending in 
addition to debt and deficits (see e.g Kontopoulus & Perotti, 1999; Volkerink & De Haan, 
2001). 
 
Controlling debt and deficits is no doubt an important part of the economic performance 
of governments, but other aspects are equally important.  One obvious candidate is 
efficiency in public service provision, which has been a heavily debated issue in Western 
countries for many years. One reason for the interest in public sector efficiency is the fact 
that many countries face a demographic development that increases the demand for 
public services, and at the same time experience substantial fiscal deficits and public 
debt. Improved efficiency in public service provision facilitates more services without 
increasing government expenditures. 
 
The question we ask in this paper is what characterizes political systems that are 
successful in terms of efficient provision of public services. We pay particular attention 
to the roles of political and budgetary institutions, democratic participation, and fiscal 
capacity. Following earlier contributions in the literature on public sector efficiency the 
issue is addressed using data on the local government level. The advantages by using 
local government data is that local governments within the same country are more 
comparable than different countries and that richer data on service provision and 
efficiency can be utilized, while there at the same time is sufficient variation in the key 
explanatory variables. A few recent studies (e.g. Afonso et al., 2005; Afonso & Aubyn,   2
2005) have performed efficiency analyses using OECD data, but they make no attempt to 
explain variations in efficiency across countries. 
 
The econometric analysis takes advantage of a new measure of total output in Norwegian 
local governments that is very comprehensive and based on a large number of indicators 
of production for the different service sectors. Efficiency is measured as the ratio between 
total output and available resources. The efficiency measure is global in the sense that it 
relates to overall service provision, and not to provision of a particular service. We think 
the use of a global efficiency measure is highly appropriate when the explanatory 
variables characterize the local government institution rather than being sector specific. 
The main advantage compared to previous studies using global efficiency measures (see 
the overview by De Borger & Kerstens, 2000) is that we have access to better and a 
larger number of indicators of service production. In addition we use a panel data set 
covering five years, whereas the earlier studies have used cross section data.  
 
With this improved efficiency measure at hand we analyze how the degree of inefficiency 
is related to political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic 
participation. Determinants of global efficiency are analyzed by De Borger et al. (1994), 
De Borger and Kerstens (1996), Ashworth et al. (2006), and Geys (2006) using Belgian 
data, Hayes and Chang (1990) and Hayes et al. (1998) using US data, and Balaguer-Coll 
et al. (2007) using Spanish data. Earlier Norwegian studies have focused on specific 
efficiency measures for nursing homes (Kalseth, 2003) and lower secondary education 
(Borge & Naper, 2006). Studies of educational efficiency in the US include Duncombe et 
al. (1997), Grosskopf et al. (2001), and Eom and Rubenstein (2006). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We proceed in Section 2 by introducing and 
discussing the output and efficiency measures used in the analysis. We construct three 
efficiency measures that all reveal substantial variation in efficiency across local 
governments, and the aggregate efficiency potential is in the order of 33-35 percent. Our 
understanding of inefficiency as a principal-agent problem is discussed in Section 3. We 
argue that efficiency can be improved through hard budget constraints and incentive   3
schemes, and that the likelihood of implementing these means is affected by political and 
budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation. The empirical 
analysis of the determinants of efficiency is presented in Section 4. The main findings are 
that a high degree of party fragmentation and a high fiscal capacity contributes to low 
efficiency. There is also some evidence that democratic participation increases efficiency 
and that a top down centralized budgetary procedure reduces efficiency. The results are 
fairly robust to which efficiency measure we use, to the choice of estimation method, and 
also to outliers. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2.   Measuring output and efficiency 
 
The main challenge for analyses of efficiency in the public sector is how to measure 
output. Bradford et al. (1969) made an important conceptual contribution by 
distinguishing between the services directly produced (D-output) and the thing or things 
of primary interest to the citizen-consumer (C-output). The general idea is that a 
traditional production function describes the relationship between inputs and D-output, 
and that C-output is determined by the amount of D-output and a vector of environmental 
variables. 
 
In the present study we take advantage of an aggregate output measure developed by the 
Norwegian Advisory Commission on Local Government Finances (Det tekniske 
beregningsutvalg for communal og fylkeskommunal økonomi, TBU). The commission’s 
idea was to establish a measure of aggregate output based on indicators of production for 
several service sectors. Six service sectors were included: care for the elderly, primary 
and lower secondary education (1st to 10th grade), day care, welfare benefits, child 
custody, and primary health care. The aggregate output measure has been calculated and 
reported annually since 2001.
1 
 
                                                 
1 The authors of this paper were all involved in this work. In a report to the commission (Borge et al., 2001) 
we discussed the general properties of the aggregate output measure and showed how it could be 
implemented. Unfortunately, the report is only available in Norwegian.   4
Table 1  Indicators and weights in the aggregate output measure, 2005. 
Sector/ Indicator  Weight
Care for the elderly  0.374 
     Share of inhabitants above 80 years of age receiving home based care   0.269 
     Share of inhabitants above 80 years of age in nursing homes  0.231 
     Share of single rooms in nursing homes  0.231 
     Share of users of home based care receiving both practical help and 
     Nursing 
0.269 
   
Primary and lower secondary education  0.339 
     Teaching hours per student  0.947 
     Share of children 6-9 years in day-care facilities for school children  0.0265 
     Share of users in day-care facilities with attendance above 15 hours a week   0.0265 
   
Day care  0.129 
     Adjusted hours of attendance in local government day care institutions per 
     child 0-5 years  
0.864 
     Play and outdoor area per child  0.064 
     Financial support from the local government to private day care institutions 
     per child 0-5 years 
0.072 
        
Welfare benefits  0.069 
     Share of inhabitants aged 20-66 receiving economic assistance  0.500 
      Average support per month  0.500 
   
Child custody  0.034 
     Number of investigations as share of inhabitants aged 0-17   0.307 
     Number of children receiving help as share of inhabitants aged 0-17   0.693 
   
Primary health care  0.055 
     Man-hours by doctors per 10000 inhabitants  0.405 
     Man-hours physiotherapists per 10000 inhabitants   0.405 
     Man-hours by nurses per 10000 inhabitants 0-6 years  0.190 
Note: The weight for each sector reports the sector’s weight in the aggregate output measure, while the 
weights for the individual indicators are their weight within the sector. Both the weights of the individual 
indicators within the same sector and the weights of the sectors sum to unity. The weighing of sectors and 
indicators is based on expenditure shares. In cases where it is impossible to divide expenditures between 
two or more indicators, the indicators under consideration are given equal weight. 
 
Table 1 reports indicators and weights for the 2005 version of the aggregate output 
measure.
2 The output is based on 17 indicators of production for the six service sectors. 
As a general characterization it seems reasonable to consider the output measure as an 
example of a D-output. It captures activities and services provided by local governments 
                                                 
2 It has only been minor changes in indicators and weights from 2001 to 2005.   5
that in most cases are clearly distinguished from inputs, but it provides little information 
about the effects of these activities and services on consumers and citizens. Although it 
would be satisfactory to come closer towards C-output, D-output is far from invalidated 
as starting point for analyses of efficiency. As pointed out by De Borger and Kerstens 
(2000), efficiency can be defined at each stage of the production process. That is, 
efficiency analyses can focus on the relationship between inputs and D-output, the 
relationship between D-output and C-output, as well as the relationship between inputs 
and C-output. 
 
Care for the elderly and mentally and physically disabled is the largest service sector. The 
local governments are responsible for nursing homes and for care in private homes. The 
quantity of services provided are captured by the fraction of elderly (80 years an above) 
in nursing homes and the fraction of elderly that receive home based care. The two 
additional indicators capture the quality in nursing homes (the share of single rooms) and 
the amount of services provided in home based care (the share of users receiving both 
practical help and nursing). 
 
The educational sector is the second largest service sector, and the main indicator of 
educational output is the number of teacher hours per student. Basically one teacher hour 
is produced when one teacher is teaching one class for one hour. The schools do also 
provide day care services before and after the school day for 1st through 4th graders that 
demand it. This is captured by two indicators, the fraction of children that use day care 
facilities and the fraction of users that attend more than 15 hours per week. 
 
For day care the main indicator of production is hours of attendance in local government 
day care centers per child in the relevant age group (0-5 years). The indicator reflects 
both the fraction of children that is enrolled in local government day care centers and 
whether they are on full time or part time. The number of hours is adjusted to take 
account of the fact that younger children require more resources.
3 The additional 
                                                 
3 The maximum children-adult ratio increases with the age of the children according to national regulations.   6
indicators for child care take account of quality (play and outdoor area) and financial 
support to private day care centers. 
 
The social sector is divided into the two sub sectors child custody and welfare benefits. 
Child custody includes activities such as foster homes, child care institutions, and advice 
and help to families with children at risk. As indicators of production we include the 
number of investigations and the number of children that receives some kind of 
assistance (either in their own family, in foster homes, or in institutions). Both indicators 
are measured per inhabitant 0-17 years of age. The local governments provide welfare 
benefits and advice for low income households that are not eligible for benefits from the 
national social security system. Most recipients are alcohol and drug addicts and younger 
adults with weak connections to the labor market. The included indicators are the share of 
inhabitants 20-66 years receiving social assistance and the average amount per recipient. 
 
The local governments are responsible for primary health care to all citizens. They run 
health centers, arrange emergency wards and provide financial support for doctors and 
physiotherapists in private practice. In lack of better indicators, man-hours by doctors, 
nurses and physiotherapists are included as indicators of production. 
 
The calculation of the aggregate output measure goes as follows. First, an output measure 
for each service sector is calculated as a weighted average of the indicators of production. 
The weight assigned to each indicator is equal to its average share of the sector’s 
expenditure and are presented in Table 1. To make the indicators comparable they are 
measured as percentage of their sample means (weighted by population size). Second, the 
aggregate output measure is calculated as the weighted average of the output measures 
for the individual service sectors using average spending shares as weights. The weighted 
mean of the aggregate output measure is set equal to 100. 
 
A plot between the aggregate output measure and available resources is shown in Figure 
1. Available resources are denoted local government revenue, which is the sum of local 
taxes and block grants per capita. The revenues are normalized such that the weighted   7
average equals 100. Revenues are measured per capita and are ‘deflated’ by an index that 
captures varying cost conditions across local governments. The point of departure for the 
deflating is the cost index used in the spending needs equalization system, which is based 
on variables such as population size, settlement pattern, the age composition of the 
population, and social factors. We also take account of differences in labor costs due to 
the regional variation in the pay roll tax. 
 






































It is evident from Figure 1 that there is a positive relationship between aggregate output 
and local government revenue (the coefficient of correlation is 0.78).
4 Local governments 
with high revenues provide better services to their citizens than local governments with 
low revenues. 
 
                                                 
4 In the figure, two local governments with revenue above 200 are excluded. When they are included the 
coefficient of correlation equals 0.71.   8
We also observe substantial variation in aggregate output between local governments 
with similar levels of revenue, i.e. some local governments are able to get more services 
out of their revenues than others. The variation in output conditioned on revenues may 
reflect variation in efficiency. This is the point of departure for our baseline measure of 
global efficiency (E
B), which is defined as the ratio between aggregate output and local 
government revenue.
5 As output and revenues, the efficiency measure is normalized such 
that the weighted average equals 100.  
 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics for the three efficiency measures, 2005. 
Efficiency measure  Min  Q1  Median Q3  Max St.  dev. 
Baseline efficiency (E
B)  45.4  97.6 104.8  110.9  135.4 10.5 
Alternative 1 (E
A1)  38.7  94.2 100.9  106.6  133.9 11.1 
Alternative 2 (E
A2)  64.2 96.2  102.0  108.1  132.9 9.3 
Note: The number of observations is 374. Data for 59 local governments are missing. 
 
Some descriptive statistics for the baseline efficiency measure are reported in Table 2. 
We observe a substantial variation in efficiency across local governments. Variation from 
a low of 45.4 to a high of 135.4 indicates that the most efficient local government is 
nearly three times as efficient the least efficient. The efficiency of the middle half of the 
local governments varies within a range of 13 percentage points. Since the sample mean 
is normalized to 100, we get the implicit efficiency potential by subtracting 100 from the 
maximum value. In the baseline case, output could on average be increased by about 35 
percent if all local governments increased the ratio between output and revenue to the 
highest value in the sample. 
 
In addition to the baseline efficiency measure, we develop two alternatives that take 
account of some weaknesses by the baseline measure. The motivation for the first 
alternative is that, even at the standard of D-output, a few of the indicators in our 
aggregate output measure can be questioned. These are teacher hours in education and 
                                                 
5 We depart from earlier analyses of global efficiency in local governments by not utilizing frontier 
techniques. The reason is that we have a large number of indicators of production, in which case frontier 
techniques would tend to produce an unreasonable large number of efficient units. The global efficiency 
studies using frontier techniques referred to by De Borger and Kerstens (2000) only have 2-6 outputs. 
Afonso et al. (2005), who analyses efficiency in the OECD countries, also utilize a large number of 
indicators for output. Based on the indicators of output they calculate a performance measure much in the 
same way as we calculate our aggregate output measure.   9
man hours in health care, which would typically be considered as inputs in specific 
analyses of education or health care.
6 However, since the level of revenues is our 
(implicit) measure of input, the analysis is still meaningful. In the context of efficiency it 
is relevant to ask how many man hours devoted to service production that comes out of a 
given budget.
7 Nevertheless, we are still concerned when the main output in the second 
largest service sector can be questioned. Therefore we also use an alternative output 
measure where the number of teacher hours is replaced by an indicator of student 
achievement developed by Borge and Naper (2006). Student achievement is measured by 
assessment grades adjusted for a large number socioeconomic characteristics capturing 
family background, and can be interpreted as the schools’ contribution to achievement.
8 
The efficiency measure based on the aggregate output measure where teacher hours is 
replaced by student achievement in the core subjects Norwegian, English and 
mathematics (each subject is given equal weight) is denoted E
A1. 
 
In the second alternative (E
A2) we take account of some other weaknesses by the baseline 
efficiency measure. First, the aggregate output measure does not include indicators for 
the (minor) services culture, communication, infrastructure and housing. Second, there is 
not a one-to-one correspondence between our revenue measure, which includes taxes and 
block grants, and resources devoted to service provision. Local governments supplement 
taxes and grants by user charges, some of the revenues cover interests and installment on 
debt, and they run surpluses or deficits. Other things equal, there will be a tendency to 
overestimate efficiency in local governments with high user charges, low interest and 
installment, large deficits, and low budget shares for culture, communication, 
                                                 
6 Borge and Naper (2006) use teacher hours as input in a recent efficiency analysis of the Norwegian 
educational sector. 
7 This understanding is in line with De Borger and Kerstens (2000) who consider the amount of teaching as 
an intermediate output. 
8 The indicator of student achievement is calculated on the basis of a dataset covering all Norwegian 10th 
graders. The data set facilitates student level regressions with assessment grade as dependent variables and 
variables describing family background as explanatory variables. Family background is captured by 
parents’ education and income (separate for the mother and the father) and dummy variables reflecting 
whether the parents are married to each other, cohabitants, separated, divorced or neither of these. The 
individual student is described by dummy variables for gender, quarter of birth, graduation earlier or later 
than expected, and whether they are immigrants or adopted. In addition a set of municipal fixed effects are 
included, and the coefficients of these can be interpreted as grades adjusted for family background. We 
refer to Borge and Naper (2006) for a further description of the procedure.   10
infrastructure and housing. These weaknesses are accounted for by regressing the 
baseline efficiency measure on user charges, interests and installment, net operating 
surplus and the budget shares for the service sectors that are left out. The results from the 
regressions are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. The sign of the coefficients are in 
line with the above discussion and most of them are statistically significant. As the 
second alternative efficiency measure we use the residuals from these regressions 
(separate for each year), but add a constant term such that the weighted averages equals 
100. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the alternative efficiency measures are reported in Table 2. Like 
the baseline efficiency measure they reveal substantial variation in efficiency across local 
governments, and the implicit efficiency potential (derived from the maximum value) is 
strikingly similar across the three efficiency measures. Despite the large similarity in 
efficiency potential, the three efficiency measures rank the local governments quite 
differently. The rank correlations are 0.80 (between E
B and E
A1), 0.79 (between E
B and 
E
A2), and 0.65 (between E
A1 and E
A2).
9 However, there is substantial agreement on the 
most and least efficient units. Three local governments are ranked among the five most 
efficient by all three efficiency measures, and another three are ranked consistently 
among the five least efficient. 
 
We will argue that the global efficiency measures developed here, although not ideal, 
represent a clear improvement compared to existing measures.
10 The improvement first 
and foremost is due to access to a larger number of indicators of production than in 
previous studies.
11 Whereas our measure of aggregate output is based on nearly 20 
indicators, none of the earlier studies use more than 6 indicators. And in the Belgian 
                                                 
9 De Borger and Kerstens (1996) compare efficiency scores using different frontier techniques. They report 
correlations that range from 0.59 to 0.99 with an average of 0.79. 
10 The same measure of aggregate output is used by Revelli and Tovmo (2006) in analysis of the spatial 
pattern of efficiency. 
11 These studies include Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) analyzing Greek local governments, 
Conceição Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999) analyzing Brazilian local governments, Hayes and Chang 
(1990) and Hayes et al. (1998) analyzing US local governments, and De Borger et al. (1994), De Borger 
and Kerstens (1996), and Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993) analyzing Belgian local governments, and 
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) analyzing Spanish local governments.   11
studies (De Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996) that have the largest 
number of indicators, variables like total population and population above 65 years of age 
are in our view better characterized as spending needs than as outputs. 
 
3.   Political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, democratic participation, 
and efficiency 
 
Inefficiency in public service provision is usually understood as a principal-agent 
problem originally formulated by Niskanen (1971, 1975) and Migué and Bélanger 
(1974). The context is that production is delegated to a service producing agency (bureau) 
that is better informed about costs than voters and politicians (sponsor). In addition there 
is a conflict of interest between the agency on one the hand and voters and politicians on 
the other because the agency has preferences for budgetary slack. Budgetary slack can be 
interpreted as all kind of non-productive activities, including low effort, over-
employment and extra salary. Thus, budgetary slack is conceptually equal to inefficiency.  
 
The later theoretical contributions have focused on how budgetary slack is affected by the 
institutional setup and the use of incentive schemes. The literature on institutional setups 
(e.g. Moene, 1986; Chan & Mestelman, 1988) emphasize that the budgetary slack can be 
reduced if the sponsor takes on a more active role in the budgetary process. One way of 
being more active is to impose a hard budget constraint in the sense that the bureau faces 
a fixed budget. A hard budget constraint will contribute to lower budgetary slack because 
the bureau no longer is able to increase the budget by reducing efficiency. In a similar 
type of model Falch (2001) shows that a hard budget constraint will reduce public sector 
wages. The literature on incentive schemes, summarized by Dixit (2002) in a public 
sector context, emphasizes that budgetary slack can be further reduced with a financing 
scheme that rewards the bureau for high production. However, because of specific 
features of the public sector like measurement problems, multi-tasking and multiple 
principals, the general recommendation is that incentives should be low-powered rather 
than high-powered. Although hard budget constraints and incentive schemes may 
improve efficiency, they may be difficult to implement in a political context. To make a   12
hard budget constraint credible it may be necessary to accept periods with low 
production, and strong public sector unions may resist the introduction of incentive 
schemes. 
 
In this paper we focus on the roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity 
and democratic participation, and we now turn to the discussion of how these factors will 
affect the interaction between the politicians and the service producing agency. Starting 
with political factors, a natural point of departure is the weak government hypothesis. 
The hypothesis was first introduced and tested by Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b), and 
basically says that debt and deficits increases when the fragmentation of the government 
increases. Ashworth et al. (2005) summarize the extensive empirical testing of the 
hypothesis, and conclude that the results are supportive of the main idea that a strong 
political leadership has an advantage in keeping debt and deficits low. The type of 
government and the strength of the political leadership may also be important for 
efficiency in public service provision. A strong political leadership may find it easier to 
impose a hard budget constraint because it is more likely to resist pressure to 
accommodate low efficiency by larger budgets. Moreover, strong political leaderships 
may have more power in internal bargains with public sector unions about the 
implementation of incentive schemes and other means to increase performance.  
 
Following earlier studies of Norwegian local governments we use a Herfindahl-index as 
indicator of political strength.
12 The index is inversely related to party fragmentation, and 











= ∑ ,                                                                                            (1) 
 
                                                 
12 These studies include among others Falch and Rattsø (1997) analyzing school spending, Kalseth and 
Rattsø (1998) analyzing administrative spending, Borge (2000) analyzing user charges, Kalseth (2003) 
analyzing efficiency in nursing homes, Borge (2005) analyzing budget deficits, and Borge and Naper 
(2006) analyzing educational efficiency.   13
where SHp is the share of seats in the local council held by party p and P the total number 
of parties in the council. The index can be interpreted as the probability that two 
randomly drawn members of the council belong to the same party. Alternatively, we can 
say that it captures the number of parties in the local council and the distribution of seats 
among them. The value of the index is reduced (fragmentation increases) when the 
number of parties increases and when the seats are more equally divided among a given 
number of parties. 
 
Our second indicator of political strength is a 4-way classification of political regimes 
developed by Kalseth and Rattsø (1998). It is based on the party affiliation of the mayor 
and the deputy mayor and the number of seats held by their parties: 
 
One party, majority: The mayor and the deputy mayor are from the same party, 
and their party is in a majority position. 
Different parties, majority: The mayor and the deputy mayor are from different 
parties and, when combined, their parties are in a majority position. 
Same party, minority: The mayor and the deputy mayor are from the same party, 
and their party is in a minority position. 
Different parties, minority: The mayor and the deputy mayor are from different 
parties, and their parties are in a minority position. 
 
At the outset we expect that the strength of the different types of political leaderships 
follows the above ordering, i.e. “one party, majority” is expected to be the strongest type 
and “different parties, minority” the weakest type. This ordering is however, not imposed 
in the empirical analysis where we use a dummy variable approach with the type “one 
party, majority” as reference. The advantage of the 4-way classification is that it provides 
a direct measure of the type of political leadership, whereas the Herfindahl-index is a 
more indirect indicator. On the other hand the 4-way classification is somewhat crude for 
the minority cases, which constitute 60 percent of the sample, since the classification 
does not capture the number of additional parties that supported the election of the mayor   14
and the deputy mayor.
13 Under the likely assumption that the additional number of parties 
increases with the fragmentation of the local council, this will to some extent be captured 
by the Herfindahl-index. We think the use of several indicators of political strength 
increases the robustness and the validity of the results. 
 
In addition to political strength, we take account of political ideology measured by the 
share of socialists in the local council. Socialist parties are defined as the social 
democratic party (The Labour Party) and all parties to its left. The basic hypothesis in 
political economy is that socialists prefer a larger public sector than non-socialists. Strong 
preferences for public services can make it harder to impose a hard budget constraint 
because the temptation to accommodate cost increases will be larger. In addition, socialist 
parties have strong ties to public sector unions and do often support the unions’ resistance 
towards incentive schemes and other reforms of the public sector. The finding of Strøm 
(1995) that socialist influence increases local government wages is indicative of the ties 
to the unions, and does also suggest that socialist influence may affect efficiency through 
wages. These arguments suggest that socialist influence will be associated with low 
efficiency. On the other hand it may be argued that the ties to the unions create a more 
cooperative climate that is beneficial for efficiency. 
 
With respect to budgetary institutions we separate between a top down centralized 
procedure and a bottom up decentralized procedure, and it is the early stages of the 
budgetary process that differs between the two procedures. The starting point for the 
decentralized procedure is that each sector works out a budget proposal. Then the chief 
administrative officer or the executive board coordinates the proposals and prepares an 
overall budget to be approved by the local council. In contrast, under a centralized 
budgetary procedure the chief administrative officer or the executive board presents an 
overall budget proposal to the sectors, including the budget size for each sector, and the 
sectors are only allowed to propose changes within the given budgetary limits. The 
centralized procedure may be understood as a mean to impose a hard budget constraint 
                                                 
13 In most local governments the mayor and the deputy mayor are elected of and among the members of the 
local council. In a few local governments they mayor is elected directly by the electorate.   15
that reduces the influence of the service producing agencies and thereby contributes to 
higher efficiency. The finding of Tovmo (2007) that a centralized budgetary procedure 
reduces the budget deficits in Norwegian local governments is in line with this 
understanding. However, Poterba (1996: 48-49) speculates that aggregate budget 
objectives may be achieved “at the cost of reducing the amount of information that can be 
brought to bear on particular budget decisions”. And less information is obviously a 
disadvantage for politicians that seek to maximize the degree of efficiency in service 
provision. 
 
The fiscal capacity of the local government is an important economic factor that may 
affect efficiency. As an indicator of fiscal capacity we use the revenue concept introduced 
in Section 2, i.e. taxes and block grants adjusted for spending needs and payroll tax.
14 A 
high level of revenue may contribute to lower efficiency of several reasons. First, local 
governments with high levels of revenue will have reasonably good service standards 
even if they are not fully efficient. The politicians may then be less eager to implement 
incentive schemes and other reforms that may be controversial politically or in conflict 
with the preferences of the unions. Second, high levels of revenue tend to go along with 
larger operating surpluses and less fiscal stress (Borge, 2005; Tovmo, 2007), in which 
case a hard budget constraint is less likely to be credible. 
 
As a final determinant of efficiency we focus on democratic participation, measured as 
the number of votes in the previous election in percent of the number of eligible voters. 
Earlier analyses of the economic consequences of democratic participation (e.g. Mueller 
& Stratmann, 2004) have focused on redistribution and growth. The typical argument is 
that an increase in the degree of democratic participation first and foremost reflects 
increased propensity to vote among low-income voters. The median voter becomes 
relatively poorer and the policy is shifted towards higher and more progressive taxation. 
The distribution of income becomes more equal, but at the possible cost of lower 
economic growth. In our view, a high degree of democratic participation is also likely to 
                                                 
14 This measure of local government revenue can be interpreted as fiscal capacity and treated as exogenous 
because the local tax rates are decided at the national level within the Norwegian centralized system of 
financing.   16
reduce inefficiencies in public service provision through more efficient monitoring of 
politicians. The argument is that active and engaged voters give the politicians incentives 
to implement policies that benefit the electorate at large at the expense of policies 
benefiting public sector unions and other special interests. 
 
4.   Estimation results 
 
The hypotheses outlined in the previous section are tested empirically on a panel data set 
for Norwegian local governments over the period 2001-2005. Because data on output and 
efficiency are not available for all local governments, the panel is unbalanced. The 
baseline efficiency measure (E
B) is each year available for between 362 and 384 local 
governments, and with a total number of observations equal to 1,856 the sample covers 
around 85 percent of the local governments on average. Since there are a few missing 
observations for the participation rate, the Herfindahl-index and the share of socialists in 
the local council, a maximum of 1,853 observations is available for estimation. In the 
cases where the 4-way classification of political regimes and the dummy for centralized 
budgetary procedure are included as explanatory variables the sample is further reduced. 
The number of observations is 1,684 when we include the 4-way classification of 
political regimes and 1,342 when we include the budgetary dummy. In order to 
economize on the number of observations, we do not include the 4-way classification and 
the budgetary dummy in the same equation. 
 
The first alternative efficiency measure (E
A1), where teacher hours is replaced by student 
achievement, is only available for 2004 and 2005.
15 The second alternative efficiency 
measure (E
A2) can be calculated for all units where the baseline efficiency measure is 
available. 
 
                                                 
15 When E
A2 is used as dependent variable, the number of observations is 736 when neither the 4-way 
classification nor the budgetary dummy is included, 721 when the 4-way classification is included, and 490 
when the budgetary dummy is included.   17
Although we have a panel, the time series variation in the data is insufficient to estimate 
fixed effects models.
16 The time series variation is particularly limited for the political 
variables that only change every fourth year, and in our case they only change from 2003 
to 2004. For the most part we report results from pooled OLS regressions where all cross 
section variation in the data is utilized in the estimation of the parameters. It is well 
known that pooled regressions may underestimate the standard errors and thereby 
overestimate the significance of the estimates. We deal with this problem by reporting t-
values based on clustered standard errors taking into account that the error terms from the 
same local government are correlated. As an alternative to OLS with clustered standard 
errors, we also estimate models that allows for random effects. In the random effects 
model the correlation between error terms from the same local government is taken into 
account in the estimation of the parameters. The use of different methods for handling the 
correlation between error terms from the same local government may increase the 
robustness of the results. 
 
The estimation results for the baseline efficiency measure are presented in Table 3.
17 The 
starting point is Model I, where political strength is captured by the Herfindahl-index and 
the budgetary dummy is not included. This is the specification that maximizes the 
number of observations. It appears that all four variables come out as significant and 
largely in line with the hypotheses developed in the previous section. The negative effect 
of local government revenue is consistent with the hypothesis that high fiscal capacity 
decreases efficiency. According to the estimate a revenue increase of 10 percentage 
points is predicted to reduce efficiency by 3.2 percentage points. The positive effect of 
democratic participation supports the hypothesis that monitoring of elected officials leads 
to more efficient provision of local public services. An increase in democratic 
participation by 10 percentage points is predicted to increase efficiency by 2.3 percentage 
points. The positive sign of the Herfindahl-index means that a high degree of party 
fragmentation in the local council leads to low efficiency. If the Herfindahl-index is 
reduced by 10 percentage points (indicating more party fragmentation), efficiency is 
                                                 
16 If fixed effects are included, local government revenue is the only variable that comes out as significant. 
17 Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.   18
expected to be reduced by 2.5 percentage points. Finally, a high share of socialists in the 
local council is associated with low efficiency. However, the quantitative effect of 
ideology is rather weak as an increase in the share of socialists by 10 percentage points is 
predicted to reduce efficiency by 0.6 percentage points. 
 
Table 3   Determinants of local government efficiency, the baseline efficiency 
measure (E
B). 
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    -2.050 
(-2.14) 
 
       
Estimation  method  OLS OLS OLS OLS  Random 
effects 
Observations  1,853 1,684 1,684 1,342 1,853 
Estimation  period  2001-05 2001-05 2001-05 2001-05 2001-05 
R
2  0.413 0.378 0.387 0.418   
Note: The t-values for models I-IV are based on clustered standard errors. Time dummies (not reported) are 
included in all equations. 
 
In Model II the Herfindahl-index of party fragmentation is replaced by the 4-way 
classification of political regimes. The strongest type of political regime (same party, 
majority) is used as reference. The three weaker types do all come out with significantly 
negative coefficients, confirming the hypothesis that political strength is associated with 
high efficiency. Moreover, the ordering of the coefficients is in line with the ordering of 
regimes suggested in Section 3 and the hypothesis of equal coefficients of the three   19
variables can be rejected at the 10 percent level.
18 The estimated efficiency difference 
between the strongest and weakest type of political leadership is slightly above 5 
percentage points. The impact of local government revenue and democratic participation 
is not affected by this modification of the model, but the share of socialists in the local 
council become insignificant. In Model III both measures of political strength are 
included as explanatory variables. The Herfindahl-index seems to be the superior 
indicator of political strength since it remains significant, while the three variables 
capturing the 4-way classification of political regimes all become insignificant. 
 
The budgetary dummy is included in Model IV. It comes out negative and significant, 
and indicates that introduction of a centralized top down budgetary process reduces 
efficiency by 2 percentage points. Although the inclusion of the budgetary dummy 
reduces the number of observations substantially (nearly 30 percent), the impacts of local 
government revenue, democratic participation, the share of socialists, and party 
fragmentation are very similar to Model I. 
 
In Model V we reestimate Model I using random effects instead of pooled OLS 
regression with clustered standard errors. It appears that the two methods of handling 
correlation between error terms from the same local government yield somewhat 
different results. The main difference is that the coefficient of the share of socialists in the 
local council becomes insignificant and close to zero. In addition the quantitative effect 
of the Herfindahl-index is reduced by a half and the quantitative effect of democratic 
participation by nearly 30 percent. However, party fragmentation and democratic 
participation are still highly significant. On the other hand, the magnitude of the effect of 
local government revenue increases compared to the estimate in Model I. 
 
Table 4 reports the results when the two alternative efficiency measures are used as 
dependent variables. In Models I-IV we use the efficiency measure E
A1, where student 
achievement is the main output in the educational sector. It appears that the sign and 
significance of local government revenue, party fragmentation, and the budgetary dummy 
                                                 
18 The F-statistic with df1=4 and df2=411 is 2.73 and the corresponding p-value is 0.066.   20
are the same as with the baseline efficiency measure, i.e. high levels of revenue, a high 
degree of party fragmentation and a centralized budgetary process is associated with low 
efficiency. There are however, quite sizeable changes in the quantitative effects. While 
the magnitude of local government revenue increases, the magnitude of party 
fragmentation is reduced by a half. Neither democratic participation nor the share of 




The efficiency measure E
A2 that controls for left out sectors, user charges, net operating 
surplus, and interest payments, is the dependent variable in Models V-VIII. Again it is 
the case that high levels of local government revenue and a high degree of party 
fragmentation significantly contribute to lower efficiency.
19 However, the coefficient of 
local government revenue is substantially reduced compared to the two other efficiency 
measures and the coefficient of the Herfindahl-index is reduced by a half compared to the 
baseline measure. Democratic participation, which became insignificant with efficiency 
measure E
A1, now comes out as significant in Models VI (4-way classification of political 
regimes as indicator of political strength) and VIII (random effects). The budgetary 
dummy becomes insignificant and the share of socialists is still insignificant. 
 
Compared to the results using the baseline efficiency measure, the impact of the 4-way 
classification of political regimes is weaker with the alternative measures. This is 
particularly the case when efficiency measure E
A1 is used, in which case the three 
variables are not jointly significant. Again the Herfindahl-index seems to be the superior 
indicator of political strength. This is confirmed when we include the Herfindahl-index 
and the variables capturing the 4-way classification in the same equation (not reported). 
We then obtain the same result as with the baseline efficiency measure in Table 3. The 
Herfindahl-index remains significant, while the three variables capturing the 4-way 
classification become insignificant. 
 
                                                 
19 The Herfindahl-index does not come out as significant in model VII where the budgetary dummy is 
included. The reason for this is not the inclusion of the budgetary dummy, but the substantial reduction in 
the number of observations.   21
Table 4   Determinants of local government efficiency, the alternative efficiency measures. 
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Different parties, majority    -1.715 
(-1.43) 
    -2.179 
(-1.94) 
  
Same party, minority    -2.244 
(-1.67) 
    -2.201 
(-1.74) 
  
Different parties, minority    -1.537 
(-1.23) 





   -2.343 
(-2.57) 
    -1.149 
(-1.37) 
 
          









Estimation  method  OLS OLS OLS  Random 
effects 
OLS OLS OLS  Random 
effects 
Observations  736 721 490 736  1,853  1,684  1,342  1,853 
Estimation period  2004-2005 2004-2005 2004-2005 2004-2005  2001-2005 2001-2005 2001-2005 2001-2005
R
2  0.674 0.671 0.655    0.174 0.197 0.158   
Note: The t-values in columns I-III and V-VII are based on clustered standard errors. Time dummies (not reported) are included in all equations. 
 
 
   22
In Table 5 we investigate whether the results are sensitive to extreme observations and 
outliers. The motivation is that there are a few observations with very low levels of 
efficiency, and also a few observations with quite high levels of efficiency. For 2005 the 
minimum value for the baseline efficiency measure is 45, but only 1 percent of the 
observations are below 65. In the other end of the distribution the maximum value is 135, 
but only 1 percent of the observation is above 125. It can not be ruled out that some of the 
extreme observations reflect measurement error, and it is therefore important to 
investigate whether some of the results presented above are driven by outliers. This issue 
is investigated in Table 5 where, for each efficiency measure, only observations with 
efficiency between 80 and 120 are included. It appears that the results are very robust to 
this reduction of the sample size. The main modification compared to Tables 3 and 4 is 





Table 5  Sensitivity analyses excluding observations with high and low efficiency 
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Estimation method  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Observations 1,723  690  1,794 
Estimation period  2001-05  2004-05  2001-05 
R
2  0.230 0.482 0.125 
Note: Local governments with efficiency below 80 or above 120 are excluded. The t-values are based on 
clustered standard errors. Time dummies (not reported) are included in all equations. 
 
 
                                                 
20 We have also investigated whether the results are robust to outliers in terms of population size by 
excluding local governments with less than 1,000 inhabitants or more than 50,000 inhabitants. Again, the 
main modifications compared to Tables 3 and 4 is that democratic participation becomes significant when 
efficiency measure E
A2 is applied.   23
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of political systems on policy 
outcomes. While most of this literature has focused on the intertemporal decision 
variables deficits and debt, we investigate the impact on efficiency in public service 
provision. The analysis takes advantage of a new global efficiency measure for 
Norwegian local governments that is based on a large number of indicators of production, 
and that represents an improvement compared to existing measures. With this improved 
efficiency measure at hand we analyze how the degree of inefficiency is related to 
political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation. 
 
Our most robust finding is that high fiscal capacity is associated with low efficiency. 
Although the quantitative impact of local government revenue is somewhat sensitive to 
how efficiency is measured, it comes out as highly significant in all equations estimated. 
This finding is in line with earlier analyses of global efficiency in Belgian (De Borger et 
al., 1994; De Borger & Kerstens, 1996)
21, Spanish (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007) and US 
local governments (Hayes et al., 1998), and with Norwegian studies of nursing homes 
(Kalseth, 2003) and education (Borge & Naper, 2006). Also US studies of educational 
efficiency (e.g. Duncombe et al., 1997; Eom & Rubenstein, 2006) document a negative 
relationship between efficiency and fiscal capacity. A possible objection regarding the 
interpretation of the revenue effect is that it may pick up that local governments with high 
levels of revenue provide services of higher quality, and that quality is not well captured 
by our output measure. However, this argument is weakened by the fact that the 
quantitative effect of revenue increases when we include student achievement as an 
output measure in the educational sector. 
 
With respect to political institutions, the Herfindahl-index measuring political strength by 
party fragmentation has the most consistent impact. It is highly significant in most 
equations and indicates that a strong political leadership contributes to higher efficiency. 
                                                 
21 The effect of fiscal capacity is more ambiguous in more recent Belgian studies. Ashworth et al. (2006) 
find that increased tax revenues contribute to lower efficiency, whereas a grant increase has the opposite 
effect. Also Geys (2006) reports that grants increases efficiency.   24
The importance of political strength is confirmed by the estimates of a 4-way 
classification of political regimes. There is some evidence that socialist influence is 
associated with low efficiency, but the effect is in most cases insignificant. The findings 
with respect to political strength is line with the earlier Norwegian studies by Kalseth 
(2003) and Borge and Naper (2006), but in contrast to us they provide clearer evidence 
that socialist influence is associated with low efficiency. The Belgian studies by De 
Borger et al. (1994) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996) also include political variables. 
They do not find any significant effect of party fragmentation (measured by the number 
of coalition partners), but there is some tendency that socialist influence increases 
efficiency. Ashworth et al. (2006), in a more recent study of Belgian local governments, 
report similar results as us. They find that single party governments contribute to higher 
efficiency, whereas socialist influence has the opposite effect. 
 
It is also reasonably robust results that high democratic participation contributes to high 
efficiency and that a centralized top down budgetary procedure has the opposite effect. 
The impact of democratic participation supports our understanding that politicians are 
more effectively monitored when voter engagement is high. A related finding in the 
literature is that a high level of education contributes to higher efficiency, which is a 
robust finding in the Belgian studies of global efficiency (De Borger et al., 1994; De 
Borger & Kerstens, 1996) and the US studies on educational efficiency (Duncombe et al., 
1997; Grosskopf et al., 2001, Eom & Rubenstein, 2006). The effect of the budgetary 
variable is a bit surprising, but may reflect that bottom up information flow is important 
for efficiency. However, since our budgetary variable only captures the initial stages of 
the budgetary process, one should be cautious to conclude that hierarchical budgetary 
procedures in general contribute to lower efficiency. 
 
Our most robust results points toward two opposing future trends in public sector 
efficiency. On the one hand, the aging of the population in many European countries is 
likely to increase public sector efficiency by causing fiscal stress, thereby facilitating the 
handling of the wave of the elderly. On the other hand, the tendency of reduced support   25
for the largest political parties will increase party fragmentation and work in the opposite 
direction.    26
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Appendix 
 
Table A1   The regressions underlying efficiency measure E
A2. 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 






































































User charges nursing homes  0.292 
(1.22) 
    
User charges home based care  0.419 
(1.28) 
    










    
 
   
Observations    362 384 374 362 374 
R
2  0.249 0.327 0.314 0.406 0.365 
Note: Budget shares, net operating surplus and net interest and installment are measured in percent of total 
expenditures, while revenues from user charges are measured as percent of expenditures in the 
corresponding sector. Since 2002 it has not been possible to split user charge revenues in the care for the 
elderly sector on nursing homes and home based care. The dependent variable is efficiency measure E
A1 
and the t-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. 
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Table A2   Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables, 2001-2005. 
Variable Description  Mean 
(st.dev) 
Local government revenue  The sum of local taxes and lump-sum 
grants from the central government. 
Measured per capita and adjusted for 
spending needs and pay roll tax. 
Normalized such that the weighted average 
equals 100 each year. 
107.47 
(22.81) 
Democratic participation  The number of votes in the local election as 





The share of socialists in 
the local council 




Herfindahl-index The  inverse  of the party fragmentation in 
the local council 
24.85 
(13.57) 
Same party, majority  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
mayor and the deputy mayor are from the 




Different parties, majority  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
mayor and the deputy mayor are from 




Same party, minority  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
mayor and the deputy mayor are from the 




Different parties, minority  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
mayor and the deputy mayor are from the 






A dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
initial stages of the budgetary process is 
top-down centralized 
0.840 
(0.367) 
 
 